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MANIFEST DISREGARD IN ARBITRATION
AWARDS:
A MANIFESTATION OF APPEALS VERSUS A
DISREGARD FOR JUST RESOLUTIONS
Kate Kennedy∗
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, there has been an increase in judicial review of
arbitration awards under the manifest disregard of the law
doctrine.1 This practice has whittled away the finality for which
arbitration is known and valued,2 and diminished its allure as a
quick and inexpensive method of dispute resolution.3 What makes
this practice even more detrimental to the future of arbitration is
that the standard used to grant judicial review varies tremendously
between circuits.4 This inconsistency was recently exhibited in
Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. Carleton College, 2003. The
author wishes to thank Victoria Szymczak for introducing her to this topic as
well as Susanne Flanders, Nicholas Reiter, and Nicole Roodhuyzen for their
encouragement and editing expertise.
1
The manifest disregard doctrine, arising out of Supreme Court’s opinion
in Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), has now been adopted in some
variation in every federal circuit. See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.
2d 27, 59-61 (2004) (identifying representative manifest disregard cases from
each of the federal circuits).
2
Ronald J. Hedges, Arbitration Developments and Trends, SL081 A.L.I.A.B.A. 1643, 1649 (2006).
3
See Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, LAW .COM , July 13,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1152695125655.
4
Marcus Mungioli, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A
Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY ’S L.J.
1079, 1080 (2000) (citing Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d
∗
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decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and the Eleventh
Circuits wherein it became clear that the variance between the
standards used to evaluate manifest disregard claims had reached a
critical level: what the Eleventh Circuit sanctions as an unwarranted
appeal may be reviewed and overturned on grounds of manifest
disregard by the Fourth Circuit.5
This discrepancy creates an atmosphere of uncertainty in the
law and the field of arbitration. Lawyers and their clients are at a
disadvantage when deciding whether to arbitrate because they are
unable to predict whether it will serve its purpose or only add to
the time and expense of resolving the claim.6 This situation casts a
shadow on the future of arbitration and leaves scholars wondering
whether the use of arbitration will “plateau,”7 whether arbitration
will continue to be abused by “poor losers,”8 or whether a
consistent standard of review will be implemented allowing
arbitration to become the reliable and predictable method of quick
and inexpensive dispute resolution as was originally intended.9
This Note will examine two recent decisions by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals10 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
752, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1999)).
5
Compare B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905
(11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to vacate an arbitration award and threatening
sanctions for future appeals that are not based on a record which demonstrates
that the arbitrator knew the applicable law and ignored it; the reasonableness of
the arbitrator’s analysis in arriving at an award is not considered), with Patten v.
Signator Ins. Agency, 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006) (granting review and
vacating an arbitrator’s award because it was an unreasonable act to carry the
one-year statute of limitations from the first contract over to the second).
6
Cf. David Boohaker, The Addition of the “Manifest Disregard of the
Law” Defense to Georgia’s Arbitration Code and Potential Conflicts with
Federal Law, 21 GA. ST . U. L. REV . 501, 522 (2004) (The author’s assertion
that the Georgia State Courts’ adoption of the federal two-prong test of manifest
disregard will result in arbitration being less outcome determinative because the
courts will have to choose factors and tests to evaluate the two prongs can be
seen as a reflection of the current state of affairs in the federal circuits).
7
Whiteman, supra note 3.
8
Hedges, supra note 2, at 1648.
9
Norman S. Poser, Arbitration: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK . L. R EV . 471, 518 (1998).
10
Patten, 441 F.3d 230.
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Appeals11 in which the “courts seem to have gone in opposite
directions in applying the [manifest disregard] standard.”12
However, rather than interpreting these decisions as the emergence
of a split amongst circuits, this Note proposes that the apparent
conflict is actually the manifestation of inconsistent analyses
applied to the same standard. Further, this Note argues that this is
the inevitable result of the lack of a coherent model for courts to
follow when appealed to on the grounds of manifest disregard, an
often-used common law mechanism for appealing arbitration
awards.13
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the history of
arbitration, the benefits and detriments to using this method of
alternative dispute resolution, and the expanding role of arbitration
in today’s world. Part II will focus on a common method used to
appeal arbitration decisions—that is, arguing that the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law.14 It will examine the role that the
manifest disregard doctrine plays in arbitration and in elevating
arbitration disputes to the courts. Specifically, this Note will look
at the manifest disregard doctrine in the context of two recent
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit cases that have applied the standard
with strikingly different methods. Part III will discuss the policy
implications of the inconsistent application of the manifest
disregard standard in the context of domestic law. It will also
further examine the side effects of this inconsistency, such as an
increase in unjustified appeals and forum-shopping. Finally, part
IV will conclude that it is time for the Supreme Court to intercede
and assert a clear and defined standard for the circuits to use when
deciding whether to review an arbitration award on the grounds of
manifest disregard.

11

B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir.

2006).
12

Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, ‘Manifest Disregard’ in
International Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 2006, at 3.
13
See James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure:
The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral
Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 A M. R EV . I NT ’ L ARB. 9, 47 (2004).
14
Id.
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I. ARBITRATION’S SCOPE AND R OLE IN A LTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A. Overview of Arbitration as a Method of Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Arbitration fills an important and unique niche in the field of
alternative dispute resolution and has been touted as a method
through which businesses as well as individuals can resolve
disputes cheaply, quickly, and privately. 15 Arbitration allows for
the resolution of claims by a mutually agreed upon third party 16
who investigates the claim(s) and makes a determination based on
the evidence.17 This process saves disputants the investments of
time and money that are inevitable in traditional judicial
proceedings.18 Further, arbitration often facilitates a more
satisfactory resolution because the parties may select an arbitrator
who is an expert in the relevant area of law and they have the
authority to limit the scope of the arbitrator’s review.19
B. Arbitration: The Pros and The Cons
Alternative Dispute Resolution includes a variety of conflict
resolution methods that can be used as an alternative to traditional
judicial proceedings.20 Private Arbitration is the most popular type
15

See William H. Daughtry, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Shifting Attorney’s
Fees in Litigation Attacking Commercial Arbitration Awards: A Disincentive
for Meritless Motions for Correction, Modification or Vacatur, 35 AM. BUS.
L.J. 515 (1998).
16
The “third party” chosen as arbitrator is not required by law to have any
specific qualifications such as a law degree or experience as an attorney or judge.
It is only when the arbitration agreement or the statute providing for arbitration
specifies requirements for an acceptable arbitrator that the arbitrator is required to
have these specific qualifications. See 4 AM. JUR. 2 D Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 154 (2006).
17
See id. § 8.
18
Id.
19
Id. § 9.
20
Id. § 1.
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of alternative dispute resolution because of its unique
characteristics. 21 It offers parties the ability to resolve their dispute
outside of the public eye, within agreed upon parameters, and often
without the need for judicial intervention.22
Despite the many benefits of private arbitration, there are also
some drawbacks.23 These drawbacks manifest themselves in the
arbitrator’s decision making power and the subsequent rights of the
parties involved in the arbitration to further adjudicate their claims.
While parties can choose an arbitrator who is experienced in the
subject matter of the dispute, arbitrators, unlike judges, are not
required to have been instructed in the judicial application of the
law.24 Consequently, the arbitrator may misapply the law to the
detriment of one or both parties. Further, without a clause in the
arbitration agreement specifying otherwise, an arbitrator is not
required to document the reasoning behind his decision.25 An
empty record can spell trouble for a dissatisfied party that has to
demonstrate on appeal both that the arbitrator misapplied the law
to the claim and that the arbitrator intentionally disregarded the
law.
C. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Is Limited
Judicial review of arbitration awards is relatively limited.26 By
agreeing to arbitrate, parties forfeit their right to a jury trial and
agree to the stipulations set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act
(“the FAA”).27 These stipulations state that an arbitration award
21

4 AM. JUR . 2 D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 9 (2006).
Id.
23
Id. § 11.
24
Id. § 11.
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also Poser, supra note 9, at 503; Christopher R. Drahozal, Civil
Law, Procedure, and Private International Law: New Experiences of
International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. C OMP. L. 233 (2006)
(quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, 30 T EX . INT’ L L.J. 89, 90 n.3
(1995) (In fact, the Federal Arbitration Act has been characterized as “barebones”
because of the limited occasions in which it allows courts to review and vacate
arbitration awards).
27
4 AM. JUR . 2 D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 11 (2006).
22
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can be vacated by courts only in the following limited
circumstances: 1) the award was obtained by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; 2) there was evidence of partiality or corruption on
the part of the arbitrators; 3) the arbitrator is guilty of misconduct
or misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of either party; or 4) the
arbitrator acted outside the confines of the powers authorized to
him or failed to execute his powers such that a resolution was never
reached.28
In addition to these four circumstances in which a court is
authorized to vacate an award, the FAA allows a court to modify
an award under the following circumstances: 1) there has been
either a material miscalculation of figures or a material mistake in
the description of an object referred to in the award; 2) there is
evidence showing the arbitrators made an award in connection with
a matter that had not been submitted for their review; or 3) an
arbitration award is imperfect in the form in which it was made.29
While the provisions set out in the FAA protect a majority of
the rights of parties who submit to arbitration, there are a number
of circumstances affecting these rights that it does not protect
against. 30 The most recognized circumstances that lead to judicial
review of arbitration awards under the common law rather than the
FAA are when an arbitrator 1) manifestly disregards the law he is
being asked to apply, 2) fails to draw his or her award from the
essence of the contract, 3) creates an award that is “completely
irrational,” or 4) where the award is bad public policy. 31 These
common law exceptions to the finality of arbitration awards
provide leeway to parties that agree to submit to arbitration but
want to ensure they obtain a just award in addition to a speedy and
economical resolution.
The common law avenues for judicial review are unique in that
they illustrate the balance courts are trying to strike between just
resolutions and resolutions that are quick and inexpensive. All of
the common law rules permitting judicial review recognize the risk
28

9 U.S.C. §§ 10 (a)(1)d–(4) (2007).
9 U.S.C. §§ 11 (a)–(c) (2007).
30
Kenneth Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the
Securities Industry, 78 B.U.L. R EV . 255, 305–06 (1998).
31
Id. at 306.
29
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associated with choosing arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution. These rules, unlike the FAA rules outlined above,
enable parties to accept the inherent risk of arbitration along with
the assurance that there is a judicial safety net that will catch them
if their award does not conform to legal norms. The manifest
disregard doctrine exemplifies this balance. Under the manifest
disregard doctrine, parties are able to appeal awards that are
contrary to applicable law.32 This provides protection not afforded
in the FAA and ensures that the goal of a just resolution is not
overcome by the objectives of increased efficiency and reduced
expense.33
D. The Role of Arbitration Today
Domestic use of arbitration has grown steadily over the past
decade.34 In light of that growth, the lack of judicial oversight
regarding the arbitration process, specifically with respect to the
structure of the appeal process, has created some concern.35 While
this lack of oversight raises legitimate concern, it is an inherent
characteristic of arbitration and it can be assumed that parties
accept this when they agree to settle disputes through the
arbitration process.36 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
eloquently stated this risk in its decision in Kyocera Corp v.
Prudential-Bache T Servs:37
The risk that arbitrators may construe the governing law
imperfectly in the course of delivering a decision that
attempts in good faith to interpret the relevant law, or may
make errors with respect to the evidence on which they
base their rulings, is a risk that every party to arbitration

32

See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
Poser, supra note 9, at 503.
34
Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit:
Round III, 38 T EX . T ECH L. R EV . 535, 580 (2006).
35
Caroline E. Mayer, There’s no Way to Arbitrate This Issue; Critics,
Firms at Odds on Policy, W ASH. P OST , Jul. 14, 2002, at H01.
36
Hedges, supra note 2, at 1647.
37
341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
33
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assumes. . . .38
In addition to domestic growth, the United States’ participation in
international arbitration has greatly increased since the early
1990s.39 In 2002, following a decade in which the American
Arbitration Association’s participation in international arbitration
tripled, the organization declared itself “the largest international
commercial arbitral institution in the world.”40
The United States is involved in international arbitration at a
variety of levels. For instance, the United States has agreed to
submit to international arbitration for disputes arising out of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Further, Congress has
codified the United States’ commitment to international arbitration
in section 207 of the FAA which includes the New York
Convention—an international agreement fostered by the United
Nations establishing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards.41 Section 207 of the FAA states that courts
under the jurisdiction of the United States will confirm
international arbitration awards unless the awards fall into one of
the ten categories which create exceptions to this rule.42
In addition to its involvement with international arbitration, the
United States (“U.S.”) takes part in international dispute resolution
on a smaller scale through numerous bilateral investment treaties.43
Indirectly, the U.S. is also increasingly involved in international
arbitration as U.S. citizens are being chosen as arbitrators for
international disputes, and the United States is frequently chosen
as a forum for the arbitration of international disputes. 44
Finally, although the FAA recognizes the manifest disregard
doctrine as a method for challenging an arbitration award, the New
York Convention is silent as to how courts in the forum nation

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 1003.
Drahozal, supra note 26, at 233.
Id. (quoting from www.adr.org).
See id. at 241.
9 U.S.C. 207 (2007).
Drahozal, supra note 26, at 235.
Id. at 244–45.
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should review the award.45 The New York Convention focuses on
the enforcement of arbitration awards in nations other than the
country where the award was decided, and therefore, does not
explicitly recognize the manifest reward doctrine.46 Consequently
U.S. Federal Courts are able to apply the doctrine of manifest
disregard to arbitration awards involving international parties
despite the fact that the New York Convention does not recognize
the standard. It is not a violation of the New York Convention for
U.S. Federal Courts to vacate an arbitration award based on the
common law of the United States so long as the award was decided
in the Untied States or a U.S. territory. 47 Given this unique
application of manifest disregard, it behooves parties to
international arbitration agreements to think carefully before
choosing the forum for their arbitration proceedings. Specifically,
these parties should consider whether they agree with the principle
of manifest disregard and whether they want to expose themselves
to the possibility of having their arbitration award vacated on this
ground.
II. M ANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW
A. History of the Manifest Disregard Standard
Manifest disregardone of the limited circumstances in which
arbitration awards can be reviewed and the most widely used
common law method of vacating arbitration awards48was first
introduced in dicta within the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v.
Swan.49 “The interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation.”50 The Court’s 1953
45

Id. at 241.
Richard W. Hulbert, Comment on a Proposed New Statute for
International Arbitration, 13 AM . REV . I NT’ L ARB. 153, 157 (2002).
47
Id.
48
See Gaitis, supra note 13, at 47.
49
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
50
Id. at 436–37.
46
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statement has been accepted by all circuits as providing a nonstatutory avenue for judicial review of arbitration awards if the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the relevant law.51
When evaluating an appeal based on manifest disregard, the
court typically looks for two specific elements of the arbitrator’s
act: that the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it,
and that the legal rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in
its meaning and applicability to the case.52 As the two cases that
are the focus of this Note will illustrate, the variances in the
standards used by courts when evaluating an appeal based on
manifest disregard are the result of differences in the ways in which
the courts interpret and apply those two elements to the facts of a
case.53 Specifically, the differing outcomes in the two cases
considered below are a result of which factor the courts found to be
determinative. This Note will focus on manifest disregard because
it is the standard that, given the lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court and the circuits’ various applications of the doctrine,
appears to provide the most challenge to courts. Some have gone so
far to say that the doctrine of manifest disregard has “taken on a
life of its own” as a result of this lack of guidance and uniformity. 54
B. Two Diverging Cases55
It has been suggested that there is the emergence of a split
between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits over the application of

51

Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12.
Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12.
53
Compare Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir.
2006), a contradiction of the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract is not
reasonable and is evidence of manifest disregard, with B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC
v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–12 (11th Cir. 2006), an “argument
that the arbitration award clearly contradicts an express term of the contract is
simply another way of saying that the arbitrator clearly erred,” is insufficient to
establish manifest disregard.
54
William Park et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37
INT’ L LAW . 445 n.3 (2003).
55
Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12.
52
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the manifest disregard standard.56 While the courts reached
different outcomes in two recent cases, these cases nonetheless
illustrate the variance of the manifest disregard standard between
jurisdictions. The result of these variations, coupled with the
inevitable application of subjective judicial interpretation, has led
to the recent inconsistent verdicts.
However, this is not to say that the circuits necessarily reach
opposing conclusions when applying the manifest disregard
standard. This Note argues that while the Fourth Circuit would
have agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in B.L. Harbert
Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co.,57 the Eleventh Circuit would not
have reached the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit in Patten v.
Signator Insurance Agency, Inc.58 This difference can be attributed
to the nuances of the two circuits’ manifest disregard standards;
specifically, which of the two facets of manifest disregard each
court gives the most weight to when analyzing an appeal.59 In
Patten, the Fourth Circuit focused on whether the legal rule ignored
by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability
to the case.60 In Harbert, however, the Eleventh Circuit focused on
whether there was evidence that the arbitrator knew of the relevant
legal rule and ignored it; the court gave less weight to whether the
legal rule was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability.61

56

Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12.
441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006).
58
441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006).
59
Compare Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910 with Patten, 441 F.3d at 235. In
Patten, the Fourth Circuit looks most closely at whether the legal rule was
ambiguous, while in Harbert the Eleventh Circuit looks not at whether the legal
rule was ambiguous but instead, at whether there is evidence that the arbitrator
knew the law and ignored it. If the legal rule is unambiguous and the arbitrator
applies a contrary legal rule, the Fourth Circuit will find manifest disregard
regardless of whether there is evidence that the arbitrator knew the law and
intentionally ignored it, while the Eleventh Circuit will only find manifest
disregard if there is evidence the arbitrator knew the law and intentionally
disregarded it. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910; Patten, 441 F.3d at 235.
60
441 F.3d at 235.
61
441 F.3d at 910.
57
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Patten v. Signator Insurance Agency

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently reviewed an arbitration decision that had been appealed on
the grounds of manifest disregard of the law.62 The case, Patten v.
Signator Insurance Agency, concerned alleged employment
discrimination and was originally brought in the form of arbitration
by the employee, Ralph Patten.63 Patten was dismissed from his
position with Signator Insurance Agency (“Signator”) on December
13, 2000, effective January 2, 2001, allegedly for violating
company policy by advancing premiums for clients. 64 In August of
2001, eight months after his dismissal, Patten sent a letter to
Signator informing the company that he intended to bring a claim
based on age discrimination.65 Settlement negotiations then took
place between the two parties; however, these negations were
unsuccessful, and in March of 2002, fourteen months after his
dismissal, Patten sent a formal demand for arbitration.66 Signator
responded with a letter stating that the company would not
participate in arbitration because Patten’s claim was time-barred
under the parties’ arbitration agreement. 67
The relevant documents to the arbitration claim are two
employment contracts between Patten and Signator.68 In the first
contract, drawn up in 1992 after Patten had been promoted to the
position of General Agent for the insurance company, the parties
agreed to arbitrate all disputes and to give notice of such arbitration
within one year of the incident in question.69 In 1998, Patten and
Signator engaged in a second contract whereby they again agreed to
arbitrate all claims; however, this contract included different terms
regulating the arbitration process. 70 In contrast to the 1992
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Patten, 441 F.3d 230.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 232 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231–32.
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contract, the 1998 contract was silent as to any date by which
arbitration had to be brought.71 In addition, the second contract
appeared to preempt the first contract due to a clause which stated
that the 1998 contract “supersedes all previous agreements, oral or
written, between the parties hereto regarding the subject matter
hereof.”72
Following the trial, the court granted summary judgment,
mandating Signator to participate in arbitration; the parties finally
began arbitrating the wrongful termination, breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
unlawful discrimination claims asserted by Patten.73 When the
arbitrator reviewed these claims brought by Patten, however, he
decided that they were time-barred and therefore decided in favor
of Signator.74
The arbitrator did not decide the case on its merits.75 Instead,
he looked at the dates corresponding to when Patten had been
terminated by Signator, January 2, 2001, and when the notice of
arbitration had been asserted by Patten, March 4, 2002.76 The
arbitrator noted that Patten gave Signator notice of a demand to
arbitrate as a means to resolve his “claims of discrimination,
wrongful termination, and breach of contract”77 over a year after he
had been terminated by the insurance company. 78 Patten responded
with two arguments to support his claims.79 First, he provided
evidence that his first letter notifying Signator of his claims was
sent eight months after his termination, within the one-year timeframe of the first contract, and second, he noted that his
subsequent letter to Signator, in which he gave notice of his intent
to compel arbitration, was acceptable because there was no time71

Id. at 232.
Id. (citing page 12 of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the
appeal).
73
Id. at 232.
74
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2006).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 232.
78
Id. at 233.
79
Id.
72
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frame stipulated in the second contract.80 Despite this argument,
the arbitrator found that Patten had not complied with the
arbitration agreements.81 The arbitrator decided that the one-year
limit in which to bring a claim stated in the first contract was
implicitly carried over to the second contract, and therefore, the
notice of intent to compel arbitration was ineffective because it
occurred over a year after Patten’s termination.82 The arbitrator
granted Signator’s motion for summary judgment. 83
Displeased with this outcome, Patten appealed the arbitrator’s
decision to the district court on grounds that the arbitrator had
manifestly disregarded the law; specifically, that he had failed to
draw the award from the contractual agreement between Patten and
Signator.84 Patten asserted that these violations occurred when the
arbitrator disregarded the superseding clause of the second
agreement and instead carried the one-year time limit stated in the
first contract over to the second contract.85 The district court
disagreed with Patten.86 The court stated that the arbitrator had not
ignored applicable laws and that a misinterpretation of the
arbitration agreements was insufficient to vacate the arbitration
award.87 Patten appealed to the appellate division.88
The issue addressed by the appellate court was whether the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law as to the time frame
within which Patten had to bring his suit.89 While the district court
noted that the arbitrator may have made an error in his
interpretation of the contract, it decided that such an error did not
constitute manifest disregard and therefore was insufficient to
trigger judicial review.90 In contrast, the appellate court found that
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 233.
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the arbitrator had “disregarded the plain and unambiguous language
of the governing arbitration agreement. . . .” and had “failed to draw
his award from the essence of the agreement.”91 As a result, the
appellate court found that the arbitrator’s decision was in manifest
disregard of the law.92
In arriving at this decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a standard of manifest disregard whereby a violation occurs
when an arbitrator “understands and correctly states the law, but
proceeds to disregard the same”93 or “disregards or modifies
unambiguous contract provisions.”94 The court elaborated on what
it would mean to disregard or modify an unambiguous contract
provision by stating that a violation of failing to draw an award
from the essence of the agreement is established when either the
arbitrator makes his decision based upon “personal notions of right
and wrong”95 or the award fails to be “rationally inferable from the
contract.”96 Thus, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the legal
rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and
applicability to the case rather than whether it was clear that the
arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it.
In Patten, the arbitrator’s application of a one-year limitation
was deemed “not reasonable” because it contradicted the clearly
stated terms of the 1998 contract which specified that it
superseded all previous agreements.97 The court found that the
arbitrator imposed his own opinions as to what the contract should
have said rather than applying the terms stated in the contract and
consequently, overrode the parties’ specific intent.98 Applying its
standard for manifest disregard, the Fourth Circuit held that
91

Id. at 235.
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006).
93
Id. quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933
F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991)).
94
Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (citing Mo. River Servs. v. Omaha Tribe, 267
F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 2001)).
95
Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (quoting Upshur Coals, 993 F.2d at 229).
96
Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (citing Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S.
Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998)).
97
441 F.3d at 236.
98
Id.
92
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because the contract was unambiguous, the arbitrator did not
merely misapply contract law or err in his interpretation of the
contract, but altered the agreement without authority. 99
Consequently, his acts constituted a manifest disregard of the
law.100
It is interesting to note that in its decision, the appellate court
invoked a standard of reasonableness when referring to the
arbitrator’s actions: “the one-year limitations period imposed by
the arbitrator was not reasonable, in that it contradicted the plain
and unambiguous terms of the Management Agreement.”101 This
Note will return to the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on
reasonableness when comparing the different standards used by
courts.102 For now, it will suffice to say the Eleventh Circuit has
not stated whether it will take into account whether an arbitrator’s
decision is unreasonable when evaluating an appeal based on the
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law;103 though given the
court’s decision in Harbert, reasonableness does not appear to be a
relevant factor in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.
2.

B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co.

In B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., the
Eleventh Circuit refused to vacate an arbitration award that had
been appealed on the grounds of manifest disregard because there
was no evidence in the record that the arbitrator knew the
appropriate law and intentionally failed to apply the law.104 In the
eyes of the Eleventh Circuit, the possibility of error on the part of
the arbitrator did not give rise to a level of misconduct that would
trigger manifest disregard.105 Rather, to invoke manifest disregard,
the court imposed the requirement that the error made by the
99

Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
101
Id. (emphasis added).
102
See supra text accompanying notes 153–57.
103
See B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–
12 (11th Cir. 2006).
104
Id. at 911–13.
105
Id. at 911.
100
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arbitrator must have been deliberate.106
Harbert is the result of a commercial contract dispute between
a construction firm, B.L. Harbert International (“Harbert”), and a
steel manufacturer, Hercules Steel Company (“Hercules”).107 In the
subcontract between the two parties, there were two schedules
specified: a “progress schedule” and a “product schedule.”108 The
completion dates specified in these schedules differed by more than
six months. 109 The conflict between the parties arose when Harbert
became displeased with what it considered to be tardiness on the
part of Hercules.110 Harbert reacted to the delay in production by
refusing to continue its payments to Hercules and by claiming that
it was owed money in excess of the balance due to Hercules on the
subcontract. 111 In response, Hercules initiated arbitration
proceedings.112 Hercules’ objective was to receive the balance it
was owed and to receive an additional award to recover other
expenses related to the disagreement, such as attorney’s fees.113
Harbert counterclaimed for delay damages and an additional claim
to recover for other costs and fees associated with the delay and
the arbitration proceedings.114
As a result of the arbitration, Hercules was awarded the
remainder of the balance on the contract owed by Harbert. 115
However, it appeared to Hercules that the arbitrator had erred in
his award because he had awarded Hercules one-hundred thousand
dollars less than both parties had agreed was the contract
balance.116 Thus, Hercules requested a clarification on the award.117
106

Id. at 912.
Id. at 907.
108
Id.
109
See B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907–
08 (11th Cir. 2006).
110
Id. at 908.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 908 (11th
Cir. 2006).
116
Id.
107
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Harbert also asked for a clarification of the arbitrator’s analysis of
the six ‘issues for decision’—topics identified by both parties to
help explain the basis for the arbitrator’s award.118 In response, the
arbitrator increased the award by one-hundred thousand dollars and
provided an explanation of his reasoning as to the identified
topics.119 He explained that his award favored Hercules because he
had determined that they were bound by the longer project
schedule which was used to guide the builders, rather than the
product schedule which had been “unilaterally set by Harbert.”120
Unhappy with the arbitration result, Harbert appealed to the
district court citing manifest disregard for the law as the grounds
for appeal.121 Predictably, Hercules responded by asking the
district court to confirm the award.122 The district court examined
the briefs the parties had submitted to the arbitrator and found that
despite evidence that Hercules had been sent a copy of the shorter
schedule before signing the contract, and thus presumably would
have been bound to that shorter schedule under fundamental
principles on contract law, there was nothing to establish that the
arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law when making his
award.123 Specifically, the court determined that the arbitrator had
likely found that Hercules was bound by the contract providing a
longer time-table for delivery, and because this was an
interpretation of the arbitrator, it was beyond the boundary of
judicial review for a manifest disregard claim.124

117

Id.
Id. at 909.
119
Id.
120
Id. Harbert had created two schedules governing the time-table of the
development project. Hercules work fell within the timetable of one contract but
failed to meet the deadlines of the other contract. In explaining his award, the
arbitrator stated that rather than being bound by the contract with the shorter
time-table “unilaterally set by Harbert,” Hercules should be bound by the
contract with the more lenient time-table. Id.
121
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th
Cir. 2006).
122
Id. at 908.
123
Id. at 909.
124
Id.
118
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Harbert appealed the court’s decision to no avail.125 Though the
evidence indicated that Hercules was aware of the shorter schedule
prior to signing the contract, this was not sufficient to satisfy the
Eleventh Circuit’s standard for reversal based on manifest
disregard.126 The court found that the arbitrator may have erred by
not following an express term contained in the contract but not
through an intentional disregard of the law.127 The appellate court
characterized the appeal as little more than the griping of a
customer “unhappy” with the arbitration process. 128 Quoting the
court in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,129 the Harbert
court stated that it needed to see “evidence that the arbitrator was
‘conscious of the law and deliberately ignore[d] it.’”130 To
emphasize that mere error in the arbitrator’s decision would be
insufficient to establish manifest disregard of the law, the court
elaborated, “Harbert’s argument that the arbitration award clearly
contradicts an express term of the contract is simply another way
of saying that the arbitrator clearly erred, and even a showing of a
clear error on the part of the arbitrator is not enough.”131
In its decision, the appellate court laid out some important
guidelines for invoking manifest disregard claims.132 As noted
above, the court indicated that error is not enough to invoke
manifest disregard133 and “misinterpretation of a contract”134 is also
an insufficient basis for appealing on the grounds of manifest
disregard.135 Additionally, the court found that manifest disregard
is only appropriate in cases where there is evidence that the

125

Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 911–12.
127
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–12
(11th Cir. 2006).
128
Id. at 909.
129
128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
130
Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910 (quoting Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461).
131
Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911–12.
132
Id. at 913.
133
Id. at 911.
134
Id. at 913.
135
Id.
126
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arbitrator knew the law and intentionally did not apply the law.136
It is clear that the Harbert Court relied heavily upon whether the
arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it, and the
court paid far less attention to whether the legal rule ignored by the
arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability to the
case. To illustrate the strictness with which judges should apply
this standard, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit has only
found one instance of manifest disregard of the law.137
In its decision the appellate court explained that policy
considerations support the strict criteria for successful manifest
disregard claims.138 The generally acknowledged purpose of
arbitration is to resolve disputes as quickly and inexpensively as
possible.139 To ensure that arbitration continues to serve this
purpose, there needs to be a method of preventing parties from
frivolously dragging cases through the courts because arbitration
appeals add cost and delay to the dispute resolution process.140
In accordance with this goal of arbitration, the court used its
decision to discourage the practice of appealing arbitration awards
and to support the utilization of arbitration by parties.141
Specifically, the court warned Harbert and potential litigants that
appeals based on the manifest disregard doctrine may result in
sanctions if the appellant fails to allege the arbitrator knowingly
ignored the applicable law.142 The court did not apply sanctions to
Harbert because it felt sanctions would be unjust as Harbert was
not on notice that his appeal could result in such punishment.143
However, the court made it clear that sanctions are a real and
136

Id. at 912–13.
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911 (11th
Cir. 2006). The only case in which the Eleventh Circuit has found manifest
disregard of the law is Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456
(11th Cir. 1997).
138
Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 913.
141
Id. at 913–14.
142
Id. at 913–14.
143
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 914 (11th
Cir. 2006).
137
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present threat to future parties that drag baseless arbitration claims
into Eleventh Circuit courts on the grounds of manifest
disregard.144
C. Comparing Patten and Harbert with Montes
In order to conduct a meaningful analysis of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions, it is important to identify two
differences between the decisions and to eliminate these factors as
deciding influences in the courts’ rulings. Notably, the Fourth
Circuit decision in Patten pertained to an employment dispute, and
the Eleventh Circuit decision in Harbert concerned a contractual
dispute. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s case involved an
individual and a large corporation while the Eleventh Circuit’s case
involved two corporations. To ensure that these cases can be
compared against one another, this Note focuses upon an additional
Eleventh Circuit case mentioned previously, Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros.,145 and compares the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Montesan employment dispute between an individual and a
corporationto its decision in Harbert. Though Montes and
Harbert produced different judgments, a comparison between the
analyses in the two decisions illustrates that the Eleventh Circuit
has applied a uniform standard of what is required to establish
manifest disregard of the law.
In Montes, the Eleventh Circuit used the manifest disregard
doctrine to vacate an arbitrator’s award in favor of an employee
who alleged she was not paid her overtime wages.146 At arbitration,
the employee’s attorney instructed the arbitrator as to the
applicable law but then asked him not to apply the law.147 As a
result of the evidence that the arbitrator knew of the law but
intentionally failed to follow the law,148 the Eleventh Circuit held
144

Id.
128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1459.
148
Id. (reporting that the attorney said to the arbitrator: “You have to
decide whether you’re going to follow the statutes that have been presented to
you, or whether you will do or want to do or should do what is right and just
145
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the manifest disregard doctrine was satisfied and found in favor of
the employer.149
If one looks at the details of Montes, it is clear that the subject
matter of the dispute in Harbert did not impact the standard of
manifest disregard applied by the court. It is evident that the less
sympathetic subject matter of the dispute in Harbert did not sway
the court’s application of manifest disregard because the Eleventh
Circuit found evidence of manifest disregard of the law in an
arbitration decision in Montes;150 Montes, like Patten, was also an
employment dispute. The court used the same method of analyzing
a manifest disregard claim in Montes as it did in Harbert; thus, the
subject matter of the case can be safely put aside as a non-factor.
To determine whether the status of the parties as individuals or
corporations affected the judicial analysis in Patten and Harbert, it
is important to consider whether the Eleventh Circuit would
employ such a rigid standard of manifest disregard in a case that
involved an individual litigating against a corporation. Returning to
Montes—the seminal case for manifest disregard in the Eleventh
Circuit—one is able to see that the same strict standard applied to
the corporation in Harbert was also applied to the individual.151 As
described above, the Montes court reversed an arbitrator’s decision
that had been in favor of the individual in an effort to correct the
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.152 Following the Harbert
Court’s close adherence to the principles laid out in Montes, it can
be inferred that the court would not have been affected had one of
the parties been an individual asserting a claim against a
corporation, as occurred in Patten.

and equitable in this case.”).
149
Id. at 1461–62.
150
See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1463–64.
151
Compare id. at 1461–62, with B.L. Harbert Int’l v. Hercules Steel Co.,
441 F.3d 905, 911 (11th Cir. 2006) (The Montes court explicitly based its
ruling on the fact that there was evidence that the arbitrator knew the applicable
law and intentionally disregarded; this is the same standard applied in Harbert).
152
Montes, 128 F.3d at 1464.

KENNEDY F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

12/3/07 10:20 PM

MANIFEST DISREGARD IN ARBITRATION AWARDS

439

D. Do These Cases Indicate a Split in the Courts or Merely a
Tension?
The variation between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, as
illustrated by Patten and Harbert, can be attributed to the courts’
divergent views of which factor in the manifest disregard standard
should be emphasized. The Fourth Circuit looked primarily at
whether the legal rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in
its meaning and applicability to the case153 while the Eleventh
Circuit looked primarily at whether there was evidence that the
arbitrator intentionally disregarded the law.154 Given the two
elements of a manifest disregard claim—that the arbitrator knew of
the relevant legal rule and ignored it and that the legal rule ignored
by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability
to the case—it is evident that the discrepancy between the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits lies in which factor receives the most weight
in the courts’ analyses. While the outcomes are not entirely in
conflict with one another, the two courts’ analyses demonstrate a
lack of uniformity that has the potential to cause undesirable sideeffects.
If the Eleventh Circuit’s manifest disregard analysis is applied
to the facts of Patten, it becomes apparent that the Court would
have not found evidence of manifest disregard of the law. Harbert
demonstrates that judicial review in the Eleventh Circuit requires
evidence that the arbitrator knew of the applicable law and
intentionally disregarded it.155 Had Patten come before a court in
the Eleventh Circuit, it is very likely that the court would not have
invoked the doctrine of manifest disregard because the evidence
presented in that case failed to establish that the arbitrator
intentionally disregarded relevant law.156
The Eleventh Circuit would have approached Patten from a
different angle than that of the Fourth Circuit. The court in Harbert
153

Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir.

2006).
154
155
156

Harbert, 441 F.3d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 912–13.
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stated, “[t]he contract is not part of the applicable law, but the
agreement of the parties to which the law is applied. In any event,
as we have already explained, errors of law are not enough to
justify setting aside an arbitration award.”157 Therefore the issue
examined by the court would not have been the content of the two
contracts between Ralph Patten and Signator Insurance, but rather,
the arbitrator’s application of the law onto those contracts. The
Eleventh Circuit would not have looked at whether the arbitrator
erred in applying a term from a previous contract to a later
contract, as the Fourth Circuit did, but would instead have looked
at whether there was evidence that the arbitrator knew the law and
intentionally applied the incorrect contract term.
Even if the Eleventh Circuit determined that the arbitrator in
Patten incorrectly carried over the one-year statute of limitations
from the first contract into the second contract, the Court would
not have vacated the arbitrator’s award on grounds of manifest
disregard of the law. Rather, the Court would have viewed the
arbitrator’s error as a misinterpretation of contract terms, or at
most, a legal error—something the Eleventh Circuit distinctly
identified as insufficient to invoke the doctrine of manifest
disregard.158 There is no indication in the facts of Patten to suggest
that the arbitrator knew the correct rules of contract law to apply
and intentionally failed to apply the relevant law. Consequently, it
can be assumed that the Eleventh Circuit would not have found the
arbitrator’s award in Patten to have been in manifest disregard of
the law. 159
It is less clear how Harbert would have come out if it had been
heard in the Fourth Circuit. Like Patten, Harbert involved two
different documents that conveyed conflicting information
pertaining to the same situation.160 However, unlike Patten, neither
157

Id. at 913.
Id. at 913.
159
See id. at 912–913.
160
Compare Patten, 441 F.3d 235, with Harbert, 441 F.3d 905. In
Harbert, the documents were two conflicting schedules, a product schedule and
progress schedule; the dispute between the parties emerged because they could
not agree on which schedule was controlling. Harbert, 441 F.3d 905. In Patten,
the dispute arose out of whether the original employment contract was
158
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document in Harbert contained a clause stating that one contract
superseded the other. It was this type of clause in Patten that made
the arbitrator’s interpretation conflict with “the plain and
unambiguous terms of the Management Agreement.”161 The
important facet of Patten is that it appears that the Fourth Circuit
analyzed the arbitrator’s analysis with regard to the ambiguousness
of the contract terms rather than the arbitrator’s intentional
application, or non-application, of law to the contract (as the
Eleventh Circuit would have done). It is doubtful that Harbert
would have met the Fourth Circuit’s standard for manifest
disregard. Due to the existence of two conflicting schedules, the
arbitrator was faced with ambiguity as to how to apply the law.
Consequently, regardless of how the arbitrator had interpreted this
case, it is unlikely that the Fourth Circuit would have found him to
have acted with manifest disregard because his decision would not
have been in conflict with unambiguous terms of the contract.
Having analyzed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’ applications
of manifest disregard, Patten would not have been found to be an
instance of manifest disregard by the Eleventh Circuit, while
Harbert would have met the same outcome had it been heard in the
Fourth Circuit. While these hypothetical outcomes indicate a lack
of consensus on which factor is most persuasive in a manifest
disregard appeal, they do not provide evidence of a circuit split.
Nonetheless, serious consequences to the role of arbitration in
dispute resolution will arise if a uniform standard of manifest
disregard is not implemented throughout the circuits.
III. P OLICY IMPLICATIONS OF T HESE I NCONSISTENT STANDARDS
A. Domestic Waves of Confusion
With the confusion as to how courts apply the manifest
disregard standard, and the newly added threat of sanctions for
meritless appeals, attorneys are in a precarious position when
controlling or whether it was superseded by the second employment contract.
Patten, 441 F.3d 235.
161
Patten, 441 F.3d at 236.

KENNEDY F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

442

12/3/07 10:20 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

advising their clients whether to pursue judicial review of
arbitration awards.162 Some members of the academic community
have suggested that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision will give
prospective arbitration candidates more confidence in the
arbitration system and in arbitration awards.163 The logic of this
argument is that if courts give arbitrators more deference, and
therefore more control, arbitrators will feel obligated to
demonstrate a greater degree of professionalism and there will be
fewer instances of manifest disregard of the law.164 Also,
presumably parties will be able to rely on the finality of arbitration
decisions with greater confidence.
However, this analysis, which focused solely on the Harbert
decision, ignores the inconsistent application of the manifest
disregard standard. Consequently, while parties to arbitration in the
Eleventh Circuit may have more confidence in the finality of
arbitration awards, it does not necessarily follow that all arbitration
parties will feel confident because not all courts use sanctions
based on the strict standard laid out by the Eleventh Circuit to
restrict unwarranted appeals. An arbitrator’s unreasonable
conclusion constitutes grounds for a successful appeal based on
manifest disregard in one circuit and grounds for sanctions if
appealed in another circuit.165 Thus, any potential validity to this
hypothesis cannot be radiated throughout the circuits. Unless the
parties are certain as to which jurisdiction they will select for
arbitration, parties will be unable to predict whether courts will
162

See Geri Dreiling, No Pity for Poor Losers, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT,
March 17, 2006.
163
See id. (arguing that parties will be more confident in arbitration because
the courts are putting more pressure on the arbitrators to be “professional and do
good work”).
164
See id.
165
Compare Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 236 (4th
Cir. 2006) with B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905
(11th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit found that the arbitrator’s interpretation
was unreasonable as the legal rule was unambiguous; consequently, the court
found that there was evidence of manifest disregard. Patten, 441 F.3d at 230.
However, the Eleventh Circuit would not find evidence of manifest disregard if
the arbitrator made a legal error, much less an unreasonable finding. Harbert,
441 F.3d at 905.
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accept challenges to arbitration awards.
Rather than feeling more confident about arbitration, parties
will feel less confident as a result of the inconsistencies amongst
the circuits. First, parties may be unable to predict the standard of
manifest disregard that would potentially be applied to their case
when entering into an arbitration agreement. Second, parties may
not be able to predict whether they will be susceptible to
sanctions. Third, because of the lack of guidance with regard to
judicial appeals, parties may no longer be persuaded by the allure
of a quick and inexpensive method of dispute resolution.
The only way to dispel the confusion plaguing the courts,
attorneys and potential parties to arbitration is to have a uniform
standard describing exactly what constitutes manifest disregard and
what evidence is needed to bring a successful appeal based on
manifest disregard of the law. Although sanctions may help
promote confidence in the arbitration process after a standard is
established, sanctions will only serve to intimidate parties from
participating in arbitration if inconsistent standards remain in place.
Arbitration will lose its appeal because sanctions will upset the
balance between the benefits of a quick and inexpensive method of
resolution and the goal of obtaining a just resolution that was
formerly achieved through the possibility of judicial appeal.
B. The Side-Effects
The lack of a uniform application of the doctrine of manifest
disregard within the circuit courts has the potential to lead to a
number of undesirable outcomes. First, if the circuits adopt unclear
standards without invoking a penalty for meritless claims, the poor
loser syndrome166 may arise. In other words, parties dissatisfied
with an arbitration award may appeal weak or even meritless
claims on the assumption that they have nothing to lose. Further,
these “poor losers” may even win their appeals since it is unclear
how the court will evaluate their claim. Second, parties may be
fearful of participating in arbitration because they will not feel
secure in the judicial safety net supporting this method of dispute
166

See Dreiling, supra note 162, at 2.
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resolution. Parties will be hesitant to participate in arbitration from
the outset if they feel constrained in the availability of judicial
appeals because of the threat of sanctions. Finally, circuits may
develop applications of the doctrine of manifest disregard that do
not conform to one another, as we have seen here with the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuit. If this trend continues to develop, parties will
engage in forum shopping: participating in arbitration agreements
only in forums that they view as favorable based on the circuit’s
application of the manifest disregard doctrine. All of these
potential developments will be detrimental to the judicial system
and all can be averted if the Supreme Court intervenes and sets
forth a clear standard of how courts are to apply the doctrine of
manifest disregard.
1.

“Poor Loser”167 Syndrome

While the Eleventh Circuit’s threat of sanctions may dissuade
arbitration because parties have the potential to feel that the
balance between a just, inexpensive and swift resolution is skewed,
the Fourth Circuit’s approach may have the same exact result for
the opposite reason. This is because the Fourth Circuit’s standard
opens the door to the “poor loser” syndrome.168 Therefore,
although Patten lowers the probability of an unjust resolution, the
decision jeopardizes the opportunity for a speedy and inexpensive
resolution.
The threat of “poor loser” appeals is a real concern for some
parties considering arbitration. The attorney who represented
Hercules Steel in Harbert was featured in an ABA synopsis of the
“poor loser” syndrome and was quoted as saying, “It seems that
more and more over the last several years, ‘sore losers’ have been
running to the courts to try to get arbitration awards vacated . . . it
is really a ray of sunshine to see the courts stand up and say
arbitration is a good thing.”169 In this respect, manifest disregard
has been characterized as a tool with which losers can “disrupt the
167

Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907.
See id. at 907 (asserting that if courts were to not impose sanctions, they
would be encouraging poor losers to appeal unfavorable arbitration awards).
169
Dreiling, supra note 162, at 2.
168
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arbitral process.”170 Individuals with this viewpoint are pleased
when courts refrain from analyzing anything except for the
“fundamental procedural integrity” of the arbitration process. 171
2.

Discouraging the use of arbitration

For arbitration to be a successful method of alternative dispute
resolution, parties must begin to perceive arbitration awards as a
judicially sanctioned resolution. Accordingly, while there are
inherent risks in arbitration,172 parties would recognize that
arbitration is founded on legal principals, and violations of these
principals will be reviewed by courts. It is important to remember
that “arbitrators are not restricted to individuals trained in the law
or a particular area of expertise.”173 This is important to keep in
mind because while parties enter into arbitration knowing that they
have agreed to have their dispute settled by a third party, they are
also entering into arbitration with the knowledge that it is a
resolution process sanctioned by courts. If parties become fearful
that the judicial appeals process is unavailable because of the threat
of sanctions, as from the Eleventh Circuit, these parties may elect
not to participate in arbitration; without this safeguard, the risks of
arbitration may outweigh its benefits.
One might argue that the Eleventh Circuit left the door open for
successful manifest disregard appeals and therefore did not
undermine the faith that parties to arbitration place in the legal
basis of an arbitrator’s decision. However, one only need look at
the intent of the Eleventh Circuit to predict the impact that its
decision will likely have. The Eleventh Circuit wanted to restrict
appeals of arbitration awards based on manifest disregard.174 In
170

Park, supra note 54.
Park, supra note 54.
172
See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 1003
(9th Cir. 2003).
173
Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN . L. REV . 449, 450–51
(2004).
174
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913
(11th Cir. 2006).
171
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accomplishing this goal and intimidating unwarranted appeals with
the threat of sanctions, it is likely that, as a byproduct, the court
will also discourage the filing of bona fide appeals. While only the
future can tell, it seems to be a natural repercussion that, with
sanctions at stake, parties will be hesitant to appeal arbitration
awards even if these parties feel their awards were unjust.
Under the Eleventh Circuit test, parties can only appeal in very
limited circumstances: they must be able to show that the arbitrator
knew the law and intentionally did not apply it.175 Because there is
no requirement that arbitrators document their reasoning,176 the
Eleventh Circuit’s standard may be very difficult to meet.
Although parties may accept this risk when they agree to arbitrate,
it seems to present a conflict: How can courts support an
arbitration model which restricts the checks and balances of
arbitration to such an extent that an award appearing to have been
made in disregard of the law can only be appealed under the threat
of sanctions?
3.

Forum Shopping

The lack of a uniform application of the manifest disregard
standard has created an atmosphere ripe for forum shopping.
Parties will be motivated to search for jurisdictions with, as in the
Eleventh Circuit, clear and favorable applications of the manifest
disregard doctrine. This invitation to forum shop is problematic
because it allows for domestic and international exploitation of
inconsistencies in the arbitration process. Indeed, in international
arbitration, manifest disregard “gives the United States a
competitive disadvantage compared to arbitral venues where
judicial intervention is limited to matters related to fundamental
procedural integrity.”177 Given the substantial increase in the
United States’ participation in international arbitration over the

175

Id.
Gaitis, supra note 13 at 16 (describing differing standards for arbitration
proceedings, including the AAA preference for proceedings that do not contain
documentation of the reasoning behind the arbitrator’s award).
177
Park, supra note 54.
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past decade,178 the potential for a backlash over courts applying
manifest disregard to international awards should be a concern to
those who want the United States to continue its prominent role as
an the arbitration forum.179
IV. WHERE ARE WE N OW AND WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?
Because of the increased importance of arbitration, it is timely
for the court to hear a manifest disregard case and impose a clear
standard for what circuits should consider when analyzing such
appeals. This will prevent the confusion, poor loser syndrome, and
forum shopping that are inherent with the current status of the
manifest disregard doctrine. However, it does not appear that the
Supreme Court is willing to hear a manifest disregard case at this
time. 180 Signator Insurance Agency appealed to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari regarding the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ application of manifest disregard of the law to overturn
the arbitrator’s award in the arbitration between Patten and
Signator.181 However, on October 16, 2006, the Supreme Court
denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.182
The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petition for
certiorari requested by Signator Insurance is surprising given the
disparity in the application of manifest disregard amongst the
circuits, and the evident distinction between the Patten Court and
the other circuits as indicated by language used in the Patten
decision. Patten is unique in that the Fourth Circuit explicitly
stated that it determined the arbitrator’s award was in manifest
178

Drahozal, supra note 26, at 244.
See Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. The authors suggest that
because courts in the United States use manifest disregard and therefore evaluate
arbitration awards on their merits, international parties to arbitration will be
hesitant to enter into arbitration that falls under the jurisdiction of the United
States. Id. It would appear that, from the authors’ points of view the Harbert
court’s approach to arbitration awards would be more pleasing to international
parties than would the Patten court’s approach.
180
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 434 (2006).
181
Id.
182
Id.
179
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disregard because it was “not reasonable”183 to carry the one year
statute of limitations from the first arbitration agreement over to
the second arbitration agreement.184 This statement has been
singled out by legal commentators and academics as a distinguishing
characteristic that makes the case ripe for certiorari review by the
Supreme Court.185 Perhaps the Court does not find it troubling that
the appellate court overturned the arbitrator’s award because the
Court did not want Patten to be the test case. When weighing the
interests of arbitration and justice, the Court may have decided that
it is more important to have a result that is just from a legal
standpoint than a result that was procured by a quick and
inexpensive method of dispute resolution.
Whatever the reason behind the Court’s decision to deny
Signator’s petition for a writ of certiorari, one thing is clear: The
confusion that currently exists in the circuits as to the correct
standard for applying manifest disregard of the law to arbitration
awards will not be resolved this year. Consequently, the poor loser
syndrome will continue, arbitration participants and their attorneys
will be at a disadvantage when weighing their options for appeal,
and the threat of the possible exploitation of manifest disregard in
the context of forum shopping will continue at both the domestic
and international level.
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Id. at 236.
Id.
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See Ross’s Arbitration Blog, http://www.lawmemo.com/arbitration
blog/2006/08/manifest_disreg_1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (question #2
for the Supreme Court: “Whether (in conflict with the decisions of at least eight
other federal courts of appeals) a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award for not
‘drawing its essence from the agreement’ on the ground that the arbitrator
construed an ‘unambiguous’ contract in a way that is ‘not reasonable’?”); see
also, Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/
2006/08/cert_request_ch.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (“The petition was
spurred by a ruling [by the Fourth Circuit in Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency et
al.] that endorsed vacating an award where an arbitrator’s decision was ‘not
reasonable’ based on the terms of a contract.”).
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